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This essay analyzes the economic causes and eﬀects of household decisions
concerning fertility, education and child labor when children can supplement
family income early in life and must support their parents in old age as adults.
Parents, who raise and educate children for both ﬁnancial and altruistic rea-
sons, will typically choose a too little schooling for the economy to grow when
all are poor. High child-raising costs or an educational process which is not
suﬃciently productive are the main reasons for the existence of a poverty trap
with a high population growth rate and little or no schooling. Interventions
such as taxes and subsidies can lead to sustained long-term economic growth,
with fulltime schooling and a low population growth rate, even without out-
side aid, if the child-raising costs are not too high and the educational process
is at least moderately productive.
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1 Introduction
With more than 250 million children working worldwide, the overwhelming majority
of them in poor countries, child labor is a major problem. At the same time, fertility
is still well above replacement levels, even though it has started to fall from the very
high levels that prevailed for most of the 20th century.
As population growth rates in most developing countries have started to fall within
the last 10 years, perhaps as a delayed response to improved health conditions and
an increase in life expectancy, it seems clear that families can inﬂuence the number
of children they have. This is conﬁrmed by statistics on the use of contraception
(contraceptive prevalence), which has increased from 18% in 1990 to 32% in 2000
in the least developed countries, and data on the total fertility rate, which has de-
creased from 5.9 children in 1990 to 5.4 in the year 2000 in the least developed
countries1.
Families have several reasons for raising and educating children – altruistic, so-
cial and ﬁnancial. Some religious groups are known to encourage their adherents
to have children, and stigmatize families who do not. Parents in highly developed
countries do not raise children for ﬁnancial reasons, as consumption in all stages of
adult life is ensured either by their own income or through savings for retirement and
social insurance. With access to capital markets being limited in most developing
countries, saving for retirement is not a viable option, so that parents have to ensure
consumption in old-age by having enough children to support them. Raising chil-
dren is costly, however, especially when they are very young and cannot earn, and
even prevent one parent from working. When they become old enough to earn or
help in running the family entreprise, educating them involves opportunity costs, at
the very least. Therefore, ﬁnancial reasons will play a major role in fertility decisions.
There is a growing literature on child labor, which has been recently surveyed by
Basu (1999). When parents decide about their children’s education, multiple equilib-
ria can rise, even when fertility is exogenous. Basu and Van (1998) and Swinnerton
and Rogers (1999) were the ﬁrst to analyze such a setting. Ranjan (1999) focusses on
the connection between capital markets and child labor: without access to credit,
1Source: http://www.childinfo.org/eddb/fertility/index.htm, UNICEF and UN2
parents have to send their children to work. If borrowing were possible, parents
could ﬁnance the (opportunity) costs of their children’s education; for the loans
could be paid back through the additional income of well-educated children. Baland
and Robinson (2000) were the ﬁrst to analyze child labor and fertility simultane-
ously. Ineﬃciency arises, as parents fail to internalize the negative eﬀects of child
labor. The setting in Dessy (2002), who also analyzes both fertility and child labor,
also exhibits multiple equilibria: a poverty trap with high population growth and
little education, and a steady state with low fertility and high productivity. Hazan
and Berdugo (2002) focus on the eﬀects of technological progress, which decreases
the relative wage of child labor and therefore encourages education. Even if the
economy is initially in the low steady state it can escape to sustained growth, with
rising education and decreasing fertility.
This paper will analyze the combined problem of child labor, fertility and provision
for old age when the accumulation of human capital can lead to sustained growth.
Parents educate children for both altruistic reasons and as a means of ﬁnancing con-
sumption during retirement. The framework draws on Raut and Srinivasan (1994)
and Bell and Gersbach (2002). The former analyze the eﬀects of endogenous fer-
tility on economic growth in the absence of altruism. As capital markets are such
that saving in the form of physical capital is possible while borrowing is not, parents
have children solely as a means of ﬁnancing consumption during retirement. Various
growth paths are possible: convergence to a steady state, chaotic, and divergent.
Bell and Gersbach examine the interplay between child labor, education and growth
when an intergenerational transmission mechanism plays a vital role in the accu-
mulation of human capital. They do not, however, concern themselves with fertility
and provision for old age.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model, which is
an OLG structure with three generations. Section 3 analyzes the diﬀerent solutions,
both interior and at the corner as well as the household decision. Economic growth
and possible steady states are examined in section 4. Section 5 explores govern-
mental intervention, with a focus on ﬁnancial measures such as taxes and subsidies,
and it compares the results derived with those of a model with exogenous fertility.
In contrast to Bell and Gersbach (2002), this paper will also analyze fertility deci-
sions. Economic growth depends on the educational technology: for a suﬃciently2 THE MODEL FRAMEWORK 3
high transmission factor the economy will grow steadily. The total size of the popu-
lation depends on child-raising costs: while low costs lead to exponential population
growth, families might become virtually extinct if raising children is very expensive.
2 The model framework
In the present setting, a household consist of three generations: children, parents
and grandparents. Each generation is endowed with one unit of time. Children
divide their time between working and learning, parents work full-time and grand-
parents do not work at all. The fraction of a childhood assigned to education will
be denoted by τ ∈ [0,1].
For simplicity, assume that only parents with identical labor eﬃciencies form fami-
lies. It is assumed that parents raise and educate children in part to increase their
own current consumption and to ﬁnance their old age. They decide how many
children to have (denoted by n) and how well to educate them. Except for the
opportunity costs of the children’s labor, education is free. Still, raising children
involves costs, and well-educated parents normally spend more on their children out
of a sense for what is proper and for altruistic reasons. Let a ﬁxed fraction of the
parents’ total income be allocated for the consumption of each child. All children
are treated identically.
As the grandparents do not work and investment in physical capital is ruled out
by assumption, their consumption is ﬁnanced solely through a grant from the par-
ents. It is assumed that there is a ﬁxed social norm, under which the parents must
transfer a ﬁxed fraction χ ∈ (0,1) of their income to their parents. Grandparents
make no bequests.
Each generation of parents is therefore linked with the two adjoining generations,
but there is no direct link between generations more than one period apart. Grand-
parents cannot inﬂuence their children’s decisions concerning fertility and education,
and these decisions, in turn, do not aﬀect the grandparents’ consumption.
Income is generated through the production of a single, non-storable good. Labor –
measured in eﬃciency units – is the only input in production. Let the eﬃciency of2 THE MODEL FRAMEWORK 4
a child be ﬁxed at µ, and denote the each parents’ endowment of labor in eﬃciency
units by ￿. Hence, the total labor supplied by the household, measured in eﬃciency
units is:
L = 2￿ + (1 − τ)µn. (1)
The production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with re-
spect to labor:
y = AL = A[2￿ + (1 − τ)µn] A > 0 (2)
Turning to preferences, the only active decision makers are the parents, and the de-
cisions they make determine the levels of their consumption in the last two periods
of life and the eﬃciency their oﬀspring will attain in adulthood.
Consider a household in period t. The parents’ current consumption, C1t, is given
by their income (2A￿t), that of the children (Aµnt(1 − τt)), the costs of raising the
children (ntb￿t, b < 0) and the required transfer to the grandparents (χ · 2A￿t) as
follows:
C1t = 2A￿t(1 − χ) + Aµnt(1 − τt) + ntb￿t (3)
Their old-age consumption is given by the number of children and the eﬃciency each
attains in adulthood in period t + 1:
C2t = A￿t+1χnt (4)
The parents’ altruism expresses itself not only through the expenditures on edu-
cating and raising children but also in their concern for the children’s future income.
In contrast to Barro [1974], we do not assume a nested utility function. Instead,
parents consider their children’s ability to purchase consumption and education for
their own children, an ability which is largely determined by the children’s eﬃciency
in adulthood. For reasons of simplicity, it is further assumed that the utility function
is additively separable and has the following form:
U(C1t,C2t,￿t+1) = ln(C1t) + β ln(C2t) + β1 ln(￿t+1) (5)
To summarize: Parents are the sole decision makers in a household. They de-
termine the number of children and their education, and therefore implicitly the2 THE MODEL FRAMEWORK 5
amount of child labor and the future eﬃciency of the children, and the consumption
vector (C1t,C2t).
Using equations (3) and (4), the utility function can be rewritten such that it con-
tains only nt, τt and ￿t+1:
U(C1t,C2t,￿t+1) = ln
h









It is assumed that the eﬃciency of a grown-up depends on the time she spent at
school, the average eﬃciency of her parents and the productivity of the education
process [see Bell and Gersbach (2002)]. If an individual does not spend any time at
school, she will attain the minimum level of eﬃciency ￿ = 1. We choose the simplest
form:
￿t+1 = zτt￿t + 1 (6)
where z(> 0) can be thought of as the strength of the inter-generational transmission
mechanism. Consider a highly developed economy without child labor (τ = 1). In




− 1 = (z − 1) + 1/￿t
If z > 1, then τcrit < 1∀￿, so that long-term economic growth is possible. With g￿ > 0
for suﬃciently high levels of eﬃciency, the growth rate will always be nonzero. If,
on the other hand, z < 1, no long-term growth is possible. In this case, the maximal
eﬃciency a society can reach is limited, the upper bound for ￿ being 1/(1−z) > 12.
In the case z = 1, long-term unbounded economic growth is possible, as in the case
z > 1. The two cases diﬀer only as far as the asymptotic rate of growth is concerned:
for z = 1, g￿ → 0 for very high levels of eﬃciency.
Using equations (3), (6), and (4), the utility function can be rewritten such that
2This is not necessarily the highest eﬃciency a society can reach, as this upper limit is computed
assuming that τ = 1. If the schooling parents choose at the upper limit is τ < 1, then the maximal
eﬃciency will be lower, namely, 1/(1 − zτ) ≥ 13 THE HOUSEHOLD’S OPTIMUM 6
it contains only the decision variables nt and τt and the various constants:
U(C1t,C2t,￿t+1) = U(nt,τt,￿t) = ln
h











Note that the utility function u(nt,τt;￿t) is not necessarily concave everywhere: it
is convex in (nt,τt).
3 The Household’s Optimum
The solution is a tuple (nt(￿t),τt(￿t)) that maximizes (7) for the given level of eﬃ-
ciency ￿t. For the solution to be relevant economically, it has to fulﬁll four conditions,
with both nt and τt being bounded in all periods. The number of children a family
can have is bounded above by biological constraints (nt ≤ nmax < ∞). The total
fertility rate of the Hutterites (a religious group in North America) – the highest
ever measured historically – was about 9.5 children per woman, suggesting that
nmax < 10. A lower bound might be applicable for social reasons (0 < nmin ≤ nt)3.
For the classical family with two parents, n < 1 can never be optimal, as C2t = 0
in this case. In order to skirt this problem, the paper will deal with an extended
family instead: pooling plays a major role in this case, as in Bell, Devarajan and
Gersbach (2003), so that n < 1 becomes possible. As each child is endowed with
one unit of time, schooling is also limited (0 ≤ τt ≤ 1).
3.1 The interior solution
The system described above has a unique interior solution. Unfortunately, this does
not describe a maximum, but rather a saddle point; for the determinant of the
hessian of the function is negative for all values of the parameters:
det(H) = −
β1 (1 + β)
3 µ2
4￿t
2 (β1 + β)(−1 + χ)
2 < 0
Therefore the interior solution is not relevant, and corner solutions need to be com-
puted. The following sections will present the three corner solutions and analyze the
3One can allow nmin to be exactly zero is one introduces the assumption that output is storable
or that credit contracts can be entered into by members of adjacent generations. This possibility
will be pursued at a later stage of the research.3 THE HOUSEHOLD’S OPTIMUM 7
areas where they are relevant economically, that is, where they fulﬁll the conditions
stated above. Both corner solutions with respect to one variable alone are maxima,
with their respective second derivatives being negative.
3.2 Interior solutions w.r.t. one variable
Whether an interior solution exists and makes sense economically (i.e. τ ∈ [0,1] and
n ∈ [nmin,nmax]) depends on the child-raising costs and the parents’ eﬃciency. A
detailed discussion of the solutions is given in the appendix. Figures 1 and 2 and
Tables 1 and 2 outline the results.
ε
τ
Figure 1: Interior solution with respect to education for diﬀerent costs.
Table 1: Interior solution w.r.t education
Child-raising costs Interior solution w.r.t. education
|b| <
2A(1−χ)
¯ n τ∗(·) relevant for moderate levels of eﬃciency
|b| >
2A(1−χ)






4¯ n τ∗(·) is never relevant
If the child-raising costs are low, the interior solution w.r.t n is either negative or
too large (n > nmax) for all levels of eﬃciency. Depending on the parameters, the in-
terior solution w.r.t. education could exist for low levels of eﬃciency and be feasible
economically. Therefore, parents will choose τ = τ∗(¯ n,￿) for low levels of eﬃciency3 THE HOUSEHOLD’S OPTIMUM 8
Figure 2: Interior solution with respect to fertility.















¯ τ = 1 n∗(·) relevant for all ￿ n∗(·) is never relevant




n∗(·) is never relevant
and low costs, where ¯ n still needs to be determined. For very small and high levels of
eﬃciency, the interior solutions with respect to neither variable will be economically
feasible.
For moderate child-raising costs and low levels of eﬃciency, the interior solution
w.r.t. fertility is not feasible. The interior solution τ = τ∗(¯ n,￿) will be feasible for
low and moderate levels of eﬃciency, but not available for large ￿, where n∗(¯ τ,￿)
could be feasible. The values for ¯ τ and ¯ n as well as the optima in the cases where
neither or both of the interior solutions are feasible, still need to be computed.
If the child-raising costs are high, the solution n∗(¯ τ,￿) is available for low levels
of eﬃciency only if ¯ τ = 1, while the interior solution w.r.t. education yields a neg-
ative level for all levels of eﬃciency. The optimum for small ￿ might, therefore,
be either a corner solution w.r.t both variables or n∗(¯ τ = 1,￿). For high levels of
eﬃciency, consumption in the ﬁrst period needs to be ﬁnanced by child labor, as3 THE HOUSEHOLD’S OPTIMUM 9
the child-raising costs are relatively high. Therefore, the solution n∗(¯ τ,￿) will be
optimal, if biologically feasible.
3.3 The corner solutions w.r.t. both variables
As established above, the interior solutions w.r.t. one variable are not feasible for
all levels of eﬃciency. Therefore, full corner solutions need to be analyzed. In
order to ﬁnd the optimum, it is necessary to compare the utilities generated by any
combination of n and τ at the boundary of the feasible set. It suﬃces to consider
the following two cases (nmin 6= 0,n 6= 0):
(i)4u(n) := u(nmax, ¯ τ) − u(nmin, ¯ τ)
(ii)4u(τ) := u(¯ n,τ = 0) − u(¯ n,τ = 1)
























u(nmax, ¯ τ) > u(nmin, ¯ τ) for suﬃciently low levels of eﬃciency
It can be shown that if both variables are at the corner and schooling is ﬁxed,
well-educated parents will be better oﬀ choosing the minimum number of children
if the child-raising costs are suﬃciently large. Otherwise – that is, for low levels of
eﬃciency or low costs – choosing n = nmax will be optimal. If nmin is suﬃciently
close to zero, then choosing n = nmax will always be optimal if the interior solution
w.r.t n is not economically feasible. The results and critical values are derived in
the appendix.
Table 4: 4u(τ) as a function of eﬃciency and child-raising costs
|b| >
2A(1−χ)
¯ n u(τ = 0, ¯ n) > u(τ = 1, ¯ n) for all levels of eﬃciency
|b| ≤
2A(1−χ)
¯ n u(τ = 0, ¯ n) > u(τ = 1, ¯ n) for suﬃciently low levels of eﬃciency
Analyzing case (ii) for ¯ n 6= 0 yields an inequality involving a transcendental expres-
sion. It is not possible to express this condition analytically for the critical eﬃciency.
As was the case for 4u(n), the sign of 4u(τ) depends on the child-raising costs and
eﬃciency. If the interior solution w.r.t education is not feasible economically, choos-
ing τ = 0 will be optimal for all levels of eﬃciency if the child-raising costs are large.3 THE HOUSEHOLD’S OPTIMUM 10
If, on the other hand, |b| is small, well-educated parents will be better oﬀ choos-
ing fulltime schooling, while poor parents need child labor and will choose τ = 0.
Although it is not possible to compute the critical eﬃciency analytically, it can be
shown that it is single-valued.
3.4 The household’s decision
With all solutions being, it is now possible to outline how the household’s decision
depends on the parameters.
If |b| <
2A(1−χ)
nmax , and the parents’ eﬃciency is very low, none of the interior solu-
tions will be feasible. Parents will therefore choose τ = 0 and n = nmax, as stated in
the previous section. With increasing eﬃciency, the interior solution w.r.t education
becomes feasible, so that parents will choose τ = τ∗(¯ n,￿) and ¯ n = nmax
4. For large
levels of eﬃciency and small costs, neither of the interior solutions will be feasible, as
both variables exceed their maximal values. Parents will therefore choose n = nmax
and τ = 1.




nmin ], and ￿ is small, the result is the same as above. For
moderate levels of eﬃciency, the interior solution w.r.t. education is feasible, so
that parents choose τ = τ∗(¯ n,￿) and n = nmax. For large levels of eﬃciency, 4u(τ)
will be negative while the interior solution w.r.t. education is not feasible. As the
interior solution w.r.t. fertility might be feasible, the household’s optimum for high
levels of eﬃciency will be n = max[nmin,n∗(¯ τ,￿)] and τ = 1.
If |b| >
2A(1−χ)
nmin , choosing full-time schooling always leads to C1t ≤ 0. As none of
the two interior solutions is feasible for low levels of eﬃciency while 4u(τ) < 0 and
4u(n) > 0, parents will choose n = nmax and τ = 0 for low ￿. With increasing levels
of eﬃciency, as the interior solution w.r.t. fertility becomes feasible, parents will
choose n = max[nmin,n∗(¯ τ,￿)] and τ = 05. For still higher levels of eﬃciency, the in-
terior solution w.r.t education is feasible, so that choosing n = nmin and τ = τ∗(¯ n,￿)
4With the parents’ eﬃciency being small, term z￿ is small while the child-raising costs are
relatively large. Therefore, fulltime education cannot be optimal, and parents ﬁnance old-age
consumption by having numerous children.
5As can be seen from ﬁgure 2, the range of eﬃciency for which this solution is optimal is very
narrow.4 ECONOMIC GROWTH 11
will be optimal. For high levels of eﬃciency, none of the interior solutions will be
feasible, while 4u(τ) < 0 and 4u(n) < 0,so that choosing τ = 0 and n = nmin is
optimal. Note that for very high levels of eﬃciency, even full-time child labor cannot
ensure C1t > 0, so that this case is of mathematical interest only.
Extremely high costs will be analyzed in the context of taxes, as societies cannot
carry the burden of such costs for long.
4 Economic Growth
The next step is to examine the factors inﬂuencing economic growth, whereby
’growth’ can be measured according to three indices: the parents’ eﬃciency (￿t),
the family’s income yt and the lifetime utility of a generation (Ut). The second in-
dex is also the social product of the household, and is therefore easy to compare with
macroeconomic variables like the GNP. Finding the growth rate of income or utility
is complicated by the fact that eﬃciency, the number of children and schooling could
all change simultaneously within periods, so that 4yt and 4ut might have either
sign. Given the fact that it is not possible to ﬁnd explicit functions for the schooling
and fertility for all ￿, as critical eﬃciencies cannot be computed, technical problems
arise when trying to compute growth rates for yt or ut. Hence, we restrict ourselves
to eﬃciency as a measure of economic growth. A big diﬀerence in eﬃciency will
always lead to a big diﬀerence income and utility, and lim￿→∞u = lim￿→∞y = ∞.6
Hence, an economic policy aimed at increasing a family’s utility or income through
an increase in eﬃciency will be eﬃcacious if increasing ￿ is at all possible7.
4.1 The critical level of schooling
The eﬃciency of a lineage will grow with time only if children spend suﬃcient time
at school. The critical level of schooling depends on the parents’ eﬃciency and the
educational technology. It is obvious that eﬃciency cannot fall below its minimum
6If ￿ → ∞ is feasible so that Cit > 0, i = 1,2.
7Sustained growth is only possible if |b| <
2A(1−χ)
nmin . In this case, parents will choose n =
max[nmin,n∗] and τ = 1 when ￿ is large. Computing income and utility, and then diﬀerentiating
the results w.r.t. eﬃciency immediately yields that income grows with eﬃciency, ∂y/∂￿ = A > 0
and ∂u/∂￿ =
1+z￿(1+β+β1)
￿(z￿+1) > 0. Therefore, growth of eﬃciency is equivalent to growth of utility
and total income, when ￿ is large, although the growth rates diﬀer.4 ECONOMIC GROWTH 12
￿ = 1 independently of z and τ. The critical level of schooling can easily be computed
from the following condition for an unstable steady-state:
￿t+1 = ￿t ⇔





















The higher the initial eﬃciency, the higher the level of schooling required to attain
it. For very high levels of eﬃciency, the critical level of schooling will approach 1/z
asymptotically from below. As parents who already are highly eﬃcient choose τ = 1
automatically if possible,8 the speed and direction of economic growth depend on z
only.
4.2 Low and moderate levels of eﬃciency
If parents are not well educated, they will decide to have as may children as possible
(n = nmax) and to send their children to work. The exact amount of schooling
depends on b and z, with ∂τ/∂z > 0 and ∂τ/∂b > 0, and can be computed using
equation (14). For low costs and low levels of eﬃciency where the critical level of
schooling is zero, parents can easily maintain the current level of knowledge. For
slightly higher levels of eﬃciency, the relation (τcrit − τ) depends on b as parents
choose τ = τ∗(¯ n,￿). Numerical examples show that parents will usually choose
τ > τcrit for low costs, although exceptions are possible for extreme parameter val-
ues that reduce τ. Such values will be left out of the analysis. For larger costs,
τ∗(¯ n,￿) and τcrit will intersect at most twice. A mathematical analysis of potential
points of intersection is given in the appendix.
A point of intersection of the two functions is a steady state with respect to ef-
ﬁciency, provided parents choose the interior solution w.r.t education. It is obvious,
therefore, that not all points of intersection computed above will yield a steady state
8Choosing τ = 1 is always possible if |b| < 2A(1 − χ)/nmin.4 ECONOMIC GROWTH 13
if the parents prefer choosing the interior solution w.r.t. fertility rather than the
interior solution w.r.t. education for the relevant level of eﬃciency. As it is not
possible to compute the household’s choice analytically, the steady states will also
have to be computed numerically. Calculations show that there is only a very lim-
ited range of parameters in which two steady-states exist. In most cases, there will
be either no steady state (for very low costs) or a single steady-state (for moderate
costs) if the parents’ eﬃciency is not too large.
Before turning to the analysis of high levels of eﬃciency, the stability of the po-
tential steady states need to be analyzed. As lim￿→0(τ − τcrit) = −∞, the level of
schooling parents choose will be higher that the critical level of schooling for levels
of eﬃciency lower than the ﬁrst steady-state and lower for higher levels of eﬃciency.
As both functions are continuous for low and moderate levels of eﬃciency, it follows
that the ﬁrst point of intersection will yield a stable steady state, while the second
steady state, if it exists, will be unstable.
4.3 High levels of eﬃciency
If the parents’ eﬃciency is large, households will always choose full-time education
if they can aﬀord it9. Whether the economy will grow, stagnate or contract depends
only on z. The possible outcomes have been presented in section 2. Long-term
economic growth is not possible if z < 1; in this case, a steady state will exist even
if parents always choose τ = 1.
4.4 Conclusion: Economic growth and steady states
As stated earlier, the economic prospects of a society depend on the child-raising
costs, the productivity of the education function, z, and the initial state of the econ-
omy, that is, the parents’ eﬃciency in the ﬁrst period of the analysis.
If |b| <
2A(1−χ)
nmax , parents usually choose τ = 0 and n = nmax when ￿ is small,
and 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and n = nmax for moderate levels of eﬃciency. If z < 1 there will
be a single steady-state for low or moderate levels of eﬃciency. If z = 1, there will
be at least a single steady-state, and up to two for moderate costs. If z > 1, the
9Parent can always aﬀord τ = 1 for high levels of eﬃciency if |b| <
2A(1−χ)
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parents will always choose τ > τcrit if |b| is very small. Otherwise, the economy will
have a single steady-state. For high levels of eﬃciency, parents choose τ = 1 and
nmin ≤ n ≤ nmax. The economy will grow if z ≥ 1, and will contract otherwise.
If
2A(1−χ)
nmax ≤ |b| ≤
2A(1−χ)
nmin , the optimal choice will be τ = 0 and n = nmax for
very low levels of eﬃciency, and the interior solution w.r.t. education and n = nmax
for moderate levels of eﬃciency. A steady state will exist for either low or moderate
levels of eﬃciency. Just as above, there will be at least a single steady state for low
and moderate levels of eﬃciency. For a limited range of parameters, up to three
steady states will exist. For high levels of eﬃciency parents will choose τ = 1 and
n = max[nmin,n∗(¯ τ,￿)]. The economy will always grow if z ≥ 1.
The case |b| >
2A(1−χ)
nmin is only of interest if nmin 6= 0.
If the parents’ eﬃciency is small, choosing τ = 0 and n = nmax will be optimal,
as long as the interior solution w.r.t. fertility is not feasible 10. Again, a steady
state could exist for ￿ = 1.
If the eﬃciency of the parents is large parents will have to reduce schooling as
soon as the interior solution w.r.t fertility falls below nmin. As C1t will be negative
for high levels of eﬃciency for any schooling and any n ≥ nmin, an economy where
|b| > 2A(1 − χ)/nmin can never reach high levels of eﬃciency. A steady-state will
exist for ￿ ≥ 1. For z > 1, there will be up to two steady-states, with the second
one always being unstable and the ﬁrst one stable.
An economy will therefore grow forever if z is large while the child-raising costs
are very low11. In all other cases, stable steady states with low values of ￿, that is,
’poverty traps’, will exist. If the initial level of eﬃciency is high enough, sustained
growth in ￿ is possible for all but very high levels of child-raising costs if z ≥ 1. If
z < 1 unbounded growth is not possible for any |b| and any initial eﬃciency.
Before turning to the analysis of governmental interventions, however, it is of inter-
est to ﬁnd parameters so that the economy grows by itself. As this can only be the
10The interior solution w.r.t. education always yields a negative τ for very large costs.
11That is, the interior solution w.r.t. education is feasible for ￿ = 1.5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 15
case if the child-raising costs are low and z is large, the household’s decision can
be easily modelled: for low levels of eﬃciency, parents will choose τ = 0, followed
by the interior solution w.r.t. education for higher levels of eﬃciency. With the
child-raising costs being low, parents will always choose n = nmax. For high levels
of eﬃciency, τ = 1 and n = min[nmax,
2A(1−χ)β
(1+β)|b| ] will be optimal. As z is large, it
follows immediately that the economy will grow if the initial level of eﬃciency is
large enough. If the level of eﬃciency in the ﬁrst period is low, but one can show
that the interior solution w.r.t. education always yields τ > τcrit it follows that
the economy will grow independently of its initial state. Since τ > τcrit, implies
￿(τ = 0) < ￿(τcrit = 0) = 1, it follows immediately that the parents’ choice of
schooling – be it τ = 0, τ = 1, or τ∗(¯ n,￿) – will always exceed the critical level of
schooling. The upper bound for the costs such that the economy always grows has
been computed in the appendix. If b does not fulﬁll condition (21), then τ > τcrit ∀￿,
and therefore the economy will always grow for z ≥ 1. For economies with extremely
productive education functions, sustained growth will be possible for a very broad
range of costs. On the other hand, if the education function is not very productive,
long-term growth will only be possible for very low costs. The paths of education
and fertility for diﬀerent costs, eﬃciencies and z are depicted in ﬁgure 6 at the end
of the document.
5 Governmental Intervention
Assuming an economy starts with a low initial level of eﬃciency, long-term growth
is not possible unless the child-raising costs are very low and the education function
is suﬃciently productive (z > 1). In all other cases, the economy will be ’stuck’
after some periods in a low-level, stable poverty trap, from which it cannot escape
without outside intervention. It is assumed that the governments’ major goal is to
induce sustained economic growth, and that it tries to do so by measures designed
to promote higher levels of eﬃciency. If z > 1 and |b| < 2A(1 − χ)/nmin, there will
always exist some level of eﬃciency, ￿1 say, so that for all ￿ > ￿1 parents will choose
τ > τcrit. As soon as the government manages to increase the parents’ eﬃciency to
￿1 or above, it will have accomplished its aim. In order to increase eﬃciency, the gov-
ernment will try to induce households to choose education so that eﬃciency in the
following period will be at least ￿1. If this is not possible on account of z￿ + 1 < ￿1,
intervention will have to stretch over more than one period. Without the introduc-5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 16
tion of a social welfare function encompassing more than one generation, it is not
possible to describe the optimal path to permanent growth in detail. A welfare func-
tion has problems of its own, however, such as the choice of the temporal discount
rate, variations in which can alter the result of the optimization substantially. For
reasons of simplicity, therefore, it is assumed that the government will try to induce
parents to choose full-time schooling as long as z￿ + 1 < ￿1 and to choose at least
the necessary schooling such that zτ￿ = ￿1 in the last period of intervention. This
simpliﬁcation makes the analysis relatively tractable, and the policy program that
emerges from it is plausibly a ’good’ one, in the sense that the goal is sensible.
In the present setting, the government can implement both ﬁscal and regulatory
measures: the classical policy is to reduce child labor and increase school atten-
dance through the introduction and enforcement of compulsory education. Another
regulatory measure would be to limit the number of children a family may have,
China being the most prominent example.
There is a broad range of ﬁscal measures, all of which can be divided into two
groups, namely taxes and subsidies. Governmental measures will usually include
a combination of instruments from both classes, with taxes being used to ﬁnance
subsidies.
5.1 Regulatory measures
The impact of a prescribed level of either schooling or fertility has already been
analyzed in the sections before. If n or τ is ﬁxed, parents will choose the remaining
variable using (14) and (16), respectively. If the resulting variables are outside their
natural ranges, the corner solutions w.r.t. both variables, as discussed in section 3.3,
will yield the optimum. This class of measures will not be analyzed further in this
context: historical evidence shows that compulsory schooling is hard to enforce when
the family would experience a heavy loss in income and there are often not enough
schools or teachers. Limiting n by decree would also lead to an increase in schooling,
but this measure would be very unpopular in most countries, and therefore hard to
implement, so that this second policy is mostly of academic interest.5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 17
5.2 Fiscal Measures
Fiscal measures are designed to induce families voluntarily to choose the schooling
the government wishes. It is clear that this class of policies is not without its own
problems: taxes are hard to collect, they can lead to social unrest, especially if they
impose a heavy burden or if they are perceived to be unfair, and subsidies can fail
to reach the needy through corruption and mismanagement. Some of the measures
analyzed in the following are not free of these problems, but it will be assumed that
these diﬃculties can be solved. The following three measures will be dealt with in
detail:
• Lump-sum transfers T f
• Taxation/subsidization of the expenditures on raising children, T b = tn￿
• Subsidization of school attendance, Sτ = snτ
For simplicity, it will be assumed that only parents pay taxes and receive subsi-
dies, while the grandparents’ income remains untouched. It is possible to rewrite
consumption in the ﬁrst period of adult life in the following form, which allows the
analysis of any combination of the measures enumerated above:
C1t = 2A￿(1 − χ) + Anµ(1 − τ) + nb￿ − tn￿ + snτ − T
f (9)
Note that none of these taxes alters the obligation to pay A￿tχ to the grandparents12.
The impact of these diﬀerent ﬁscal measures on the household’s decision will be
examined in sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.4. In all these sections, it will be assumed that
subsidies are ﬁnanced through the taxation of other families or through grants from
international organizations: a household is either taxed or subsidized, but not both.
Therefore the issue of ﬁnancing the subsidies and the use of the revenues from
taxation respectively will be irrelevant for the analysis of the individual household’s
decision. As the total revenues which can be raised through each measure and
the total costs of subsidizing a household play an important role in the setup of a
program, the diﬀerent measures will also be compared with respect to their beneﬁts
and costs in the following sections. An integrated analysis of a program comprising
both taxes and subsidies will be developed in sections 5.3 and 5.4.
12The normal procedure in analyzing such problems is to write down the lifetime budget con-
straint, and then to appeal to the normalcy of goods in consumption to obtain comparative static
results. This is not possible in the present cases, as output is not storable and there are two
separate budget constraints which cannot be combined.5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 18
5.2.1 Lump-sum transfers
Note ﬁrst that, the adults’ level of eﬃciency being ﬁxed, a lump-sum transfer T f
will be equivalent to taxing the parents’ income (t · (2A￿)), with t = T f/(2A￿).
Therefore, the following analysis of a lump-sum transfer will also hold for an income
tax.
If a family transfers a ﬁxed amount of money T f to the government, or receives
such a transfer, it will in general change its desired level of fertility or the children’s
education or both. As we have seen, if parents are poor (￿ low), they will typically
choose τ < 1 and n = nmax. If the budget set is suﬃciently enlarged through a
lump-sum subsidy, parents will increase the children’s education, as a further in-
crease in n is not possible. The lump-sum subsidy in the ﬁrst period is partially
transferred to the second period through additional education, and lifetime con-
sumption is smoothed.
If parents are rich, they choose n ≤ nmax and τ = 1. Since a transfer cannot
increase education in this case, parents will ’invest’ part of it in raising more chil-
dren. The higher the parents’ eﬃciency, the lower will be the impact of the transfer.
If parents chose n = nmax and τ = 1 before receiving the transfer, all subsidies will
be fully consumed in the ﬁrst period of adult life.
The impact of a lump-sum tax will be similar: poor parents will rather increase
child labor than reduce fertility, as the returns from education are limited if the
parents’ eﬃciency is low. Again, this leads to a smoothing of income over the life
cycle. If the parents are rich, educating children is highly productive, so that rich
parents will leave τ(= 1) unchanged and reduce fertility, unless raising children is
extremely cheap (b ≈ 0). In that case, parents will maintain fertility and decrease
τ instead. The impact of the transfer decreases as the parents’ eﬃciency increases.
If the tax is so large that a further reduction of fertility is not possible, parents will
have to reduce education to ﬁnance their tax obligations. The maximal tax a rich
family can pay depends on nmin and |b| as follows.
If |b| < Aµ/￿, parents will reduce schooling rather than fertility.
T
f
max = 2A￿(1 − χ) + nmax(Aµ + b￿) > 2A￿(1 − χ).5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 19
As fertility remains unchanged this result is independent of nmin. For |b| > Aµ/￿,
parents will always reduce fertility, if possible, before reducing schooling.
If nmin > 0, large taxes will force families to reduce schooling, as child labor will be




max = 2A￿(1 − χ) + nmin(Aµ + b￿) < 2A￿(1 − χ).
If fertility is given exogenously (nex), the total tax such families can pay is
Tex = 2A￿(1 − χ) + nex(Aµ + b￿).
As |b| > Aµ/￿ for large levels of eﬃciency, it follows that T f
max ≥ Tex if nex ≥ nmin.
Therefore, the total tax revenues in the case where fertility is exogenous will be no
higher than the revenues in the case where fertility is endogenous. In the case with
endogenous fertility and nmin suﬃciently close to zero, large taxes will only lead
to a strong reduction of fertility, while education remains unchanged, being highly
productive: T f
max = 2A￿(1 − χ).
If the parents’ eﬃciency is suﬃciently high, they will be able to pay any lump-
sum tax. Ignoring the case where |b| < Aµ/￿, as it is irrelevant for high levels of
eﬃciency, a society without constraints on nmin will be able to aﬀord higher taxes
than a society where nmin is appreciably diﬀerent from zero. The ’price’ such a
society pays is still very high: rich families could virtually die out when confronted
with extremely high taxes. Although a community with nmin > 0 will pay less in
taxes, there is still a danger in requiring rich families to pay the maximum they can
aﬀord: as they will ﬁnance their tax payments by sending their children to work, it
is future generations who will bear the burden of the measure. As education can fall
to τ = 0, eﬃciency in the next period can be as low as ￿ = 1, leading the economy in
the poverty trap. It is highly probable that families confronted with such taxes will
try to avoid paying them independently of nmin. Therefore, these cases are mainly
of mathematical interest.
5.2.2 Taxes and subsidies on the child-raising costs
In the present framework, a tax on the expenditures incurred in raising children will
not be shifted. The tax can be interpreted as an increase of the expenditures on5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 20
raising children |b|. Its impact on the household’s decision can be derived analyzing
(14) for n = ¯ n, (16) for τ = ¯ τ and (17) and (19) for the full corner solutions, while
taking into account that switching between solutions is possible. As in the previous
case, it is necessary to diﬀerentiate between poor and rich families, and low and
high taxes/subsidies.
Poor parents – who usually choose n = nmax and the interior solution with respect
to education – will reduce schooling and leave fertility unchanged, as ∂τ∗(·)/∂b > 0.
Rich parents – who choose the corner solution with respect to education – will reduce
fertility (∂n∗(·)/∂b > 0). If the child-raising costs are larger, the interior solution
w.r.t. fertility will become feasible for lower levels of eﬃciency than in the case where
|b| is low, as depicted in ﬁgure 2. Therefore, even a small tax on the expenditures
on raising children can change the solution dramatically for some ￿. In this case,
parents confronted with low costs will choose τ ≤ 1 and n = nmax while parents con-
fronted with a tax reduce fertility and select full-time schooling τ = 1 and n < nmax.
When confronted with a very high tax on the expenditures on raising children,
even those poor parents who would have chosen n = nmax and τ = 0 will reduce the
number of children. In order to maintain consumption in the last period of life, they
will also increase schooling to τ = 1. Therefore, a very high tax on the child-raising
costs will lead to full-time schooling, while reducing consumption in all periods of
life and population growth signiﬁcantly. As in the above cases, it is very improbable
that such a tax can be enforced.
If the tax is not too high and parents do not reduce fertility, the maximal rev-
enue to be gained from such a measure will be nmaxt￿. In this case, the total tax
revenue will be identical to the case where a lump-sum tax was raised, as all vari-
ables have identical values for both taxes. The critical level of t so that parents do
not reduce fertility – that is, u(τ = 0,n = nmax) > u(τ = 1,n = n∗), which means
that the interior solution w.r.t. n becomes feasible – cannot be computed analyti-
cally. As soon as t exceeds this level, n will decrease with τ = 1, and the total tax
revenue will approach
β (2A￿(1−χ))
1+β < 2A￿(1 − χ) asymptotically with t → ∞ if nmin5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 21
is suﬃciently close to zero13. If nmin > 0, it is not possible to impose an unlimited
tax on the child-raising costs, so that t is limited. The maximal tax revenue will
be 2A￿(1 − χ) + nmin(Aµ + b￿). It depends on parameters whether the total tax
revenue in the case where n is reduced is higher or lower than in the case where τ is
reduced. In any case, if the parents are poor the total tax revenue raised through a
lump-sum tax will be at least as high as the revenue from a tax on the child-raising
costs.
Rich parents confronted with a tax will reduce fertility ﬁrst. If nmin is very low
(nmin ≈ 0), families will respond to any increase in b by reducing n while leaving
τ = 1 unchanged. The maximal tax revenue is
β (2A￿(1−χ))
1+β < 2A￿(1 − χ), as in the
case where parents are poor. If, on the other hand, nmin > 0, parents will reduce
τ if the child-raising costs exceed some level. The result for fertility, education and
total tax revenue and its consequences for future generations will be the same as
in the case where a lump-sum tax was raised; the comparison with the case where
fertility is endogenous will also yield similar results.
As soon as parents decide to reduce fertility in order to ﬁnance the tax, total gov-
ernment revenues will be reduced. Therefore, this form of taxing is not very eﬃcient
as a means of raising public revenue.
If raising children is suﬃciently subsidized (t < 0), poor parents14 will choose τ = 1.
Therefore, such a subsidy will yield the result desired by the government. The
amount of subsidy needed to raise τ to the level τ0 can easily be computed using





Anµ{1 + z￿[τ0 + (τ0 − 1)(β + β1)]}
z ¯ n￿2 (β + β1)



















14Poor parents usually choose the interior solution w.r.t education and n = nmax. If the subsidy
does not trigger switching between solutions, and if it is suﬃciently large, they will choose n = nmax
and τ = 1. If the subsidy triggers switching between solutions, parents will choose the interior
solution w.r.t education and τ = 1.5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 22
5.2.3 School-attendance subsidies
The subsidy to promote education takes the form of a ﬁxed cash transfer s ≥ 0 for
each unit of time each child spends at school. Therefore the total subsidy a family
receives will be Sτ = snτ. School fees (i.e. s < 0) will be ignored.
As in the previous section, the families receiving this subsidy are not taxed in any
way. Therefore, (4) will not change, while (3) can be rewritten:
C1t = 2A￿(1 − χ) + Anµ(1 − τ) + nb￿ + snτ
= 2A￿(1 − χ) + nb￿ + Anµ + nτ(s − Aµ)
If the attendance-subsidy per child exceeds Aµ, the opportunity costs of education
will be negative, so that families will never choose τ < 1. Trivially, full-time educa-
tion can easily be achieved if the government, in eﬀect, makes good for the income
loss families would otherwise experience. It remains to be seen whether there is a
smaller subsidy (s < Aµ) such that parents still choose τ = 1, and whether this way
of inducing an increase in τ is more or less costly than other measures.
Analyzing ﬁrst the interior solution w.r.t. education (n = ¯ n), the new level of
schooling depends on the subsidy as follows:
τ(¯ n,￿,s) =
z￿(β + β1)[2A￿(1 − χ) + ¯ nAµ + b¯ n￿] + n(s − Aµ)
¯ nz￿(1 + β + β1)(Aµ − s)
(10)





15. As the level of schooling the government wants to achieve is τ0 ≤ 1(￿ ∞), it
is obvious that there exists some subsidy s < Aµ that will suﬃce to induce parents
to choose τ0 in this case (see ﬁgure 3). With ∂τ/∂s > 0, moreover, the eﬃciency for
which the interior solution w.r.t. education becomes feasible (τ ≥ 0) will be lower
for higher subsidies. If s is suﬃciently high (s < Aµ), any level of schooling can be
achieved for any eﬃciency. Therefore, even if the schooling parents choose for some
(low) eﬃciency is zero, there will exist some subsidy s < Aµ such that parents prefer
τ = τ0. For high levels of eﬃciency, three scenarios are possible. If b ≤
2A(1−χ)
nmin and
15This condition for the costs states that consumption in the ﬁrst period of adult life is nonneg-
ative if children work full-time. If the condition is not fulﬁlled, parents cannot survive in the ﬁrst
period without outside help even for τ = 0. In reality, therefore, one can assume this condition to
be fulﬁlled for some n for all societies.5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 23
Figure 3: Interior solution with respect to education with subsidies (for Aµ = 1/4)
z ≥ 1, parents will choose τ > τcrit, and no subsidy is needed. If b ≤
2A(1−χ)
nmin and
z < 1, long-term growth is not possible, so that this case will not be analyzed. If
b >
2A(1−χ)
nmin , very high levels of eﬃciency are not relevant economically, as parents
cannot maintain C1t > 0, even if their oﬀspring work full-time. The value of z is
irrelevant in this case.
5.2.4 Comparing subsidies: the interior solution w.r.t. education
In this section, the total subsidies needed to induce parents to choose some value of
τ1 ≤ 1 will be compared. The focus will be on the interior solution w.r.t. education,
as this case can be analyzed more easily and as the steady-state of most economies
lies in this area. Therefore, regime-switching will be left out of the analysis at this
stage, so that fertility is ﬁxed (n = ¯ n). The problems arising when regime-switching
is taken into account – that is, where fertility is not ﬁxed – are addressed at the end
of the section.
It is easy to show that subsidizing the expenditures on raising children and a ﬂat5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 24
transfer will cost the same. The total subsidy needed in both cases is16:
S1 =






In the case where the government subsidizes school-attendance directly, the total
subsidy required to raise the level of schooling from τ to τ1 is:
S2 =
K2
z￿(β + β1) + z￿ + 1/τ1
(12)
The numerators of both equations are identical (K1 = K2 > 0), but the denomina-
tors diﬀer. As z￿(β +β1)+z￿+1/τ1 > z￿(β +β1), ∀￿,τ1 > 0, it follows immediately
that S2 < S1 for all ￿ and τ1 > τ. That is, the total subsidy required to induce par-
ents to choose some level of schooling τ1 > τ will be lower if education is subsidized
directly. This exempliﬁes the principle of targeting: as a school-attendance subsidy
directly attacks the distortion arising from externalities from education it will be
the most eﬃcient way to increase the level of schooling. Comparing the inﬂuence
on consumption in the ﬁrst period of a school-attendance subsidy s and a subsidy
sc conﬁrms this result: ∂C1t/∂s < 0 and ∂C1t/∂sc > 0. A subsidy on expenditures
on raising children will increase C1t. A subsidy on school-attendance will reduce C1t.
In the case where corner solutions w.r.t education hold, the analysis is much more
diﬃcult, as regime-switching becomes relevant and no analytic results are possible.
The exact subsidy needed in each case depends on the parents’ initial eﬃciency, the
child-raising costs and the education productivity factor z, and can only be com-
puted numerically. Therefore, it is not possible to state in advance which subsidy
will be the cheapest. The interventions calculated above in equations (11) and (12)
constitute an upper limit for the total subsidy needed in the case where corner so-
lutions w.r.t. education are optimal after the intervention, and the total transfer
required can be much lower in some cases17.
16This is computed as follows: ﬁnd the subsidy t needed to achieve the level of schooling τ1 for
the interior solution. Then compute tn￿. In an analogous way, one can directly compute the cash
transfer Tf needed to raise the level of schooling from τ to τ1. It can then be shown that K1 > 0
for τ < τ1, that is, a positive subsidy is needed to raise the level of schooling.
17Particularly in the immediate vicinity of the point of discontinuity w.r.t. education and n (see
ﬁgure 6), where the interior solution w.r.t. fertility becomes optimal, the total subsidy will be very
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5.3 Policy Programs
Subsidizing education for a ﬁnite number of periods will always lead to parents
eventually choosing τ > τcrit forever after, if z > 1 and |b| <
2A(1−χ)
nmin , that is, if
sustainable growth is possible. The total resources needed depend on everything in
the system but an upper limit thereon can be computed as follows: Assuming that
the parents’ initial level of eﬃciency is ￿0 < ￿018, let P periods be needed to reach ￿0.
The program will consist of subsidies, so that parents are induced to choose τ = 1
during the ﬁrst P − 1 periods. In the last period P, parents will choose the level of
schooling such that zτP￿P + 1 = ￿0. Without discounting, the total amount needed,
measured in units of output, is S = S1 + S2 + ... + SP, where Si denotes the total
subsidy needed in period i. As subsidizing school attendance is cheaper as long as
the interior solution w.r.t. education is chosen, one can compute Si using equation
(12) and update the parents’ eﬃciency in any period as follows: ￿p = z￿p−1 + 1 for
p < P and ￿P = zτP￿P−1 + 1 = ￿0. Backwards induction then yields the minimum
number of periods needed to reach ￿0. Given that only the interior solution w.r.t.
education is analyzed, the number of children born in any period will be constant.
If it is possible to ﬁnance the measure from abroad, for example through loans
to be paid back no earlier than after P periods, or in some other way which does
not involve taxation during the periods in which the subsidy is paid, it is possible
for the whole society to escape the poverty trap simultaneously and in ﬁnite time.
If the measure has to be ﬁnanced through taxes, whether a successful programme
can be set up depends on the system’s parameters.
The most simple program, in which no subsidies whatsoever are required, is one
where poor families – who would otherwise choose τ ≤ τcrit and n = nmax – have
to pay a very high tax on the expenditures incurred in raising children. Confronted
with this measure, parents will reduce the number of children and increase schooling
to τ = 1. As in the case of a subsidy fully ﬁnanced from abroad, it is possible to
raise the eﬃciency of the whole society simultaneously to ￿0 or above. Such a pro-
gram would not be easy to implement, however, as it would reduce the consumption
and utility of at least one generation dramatically. If the taxes raised were used to
subsidize the same families, this measure would be equivalent to a change in relative
18Note that ￿0 is chosen so that parents choose τ > τcrit for all ￿ > ￿0.5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 26
prices. For a homogenous society, the governments’ balanced-budget condition is
stτtnt = ttnt￿t. Therefore, for any choice of st, tt is fully implied. Families experi-
encing such a measure might change their decision to reduce fertility and increase
education.
In the present setting, there are no other programs such that the whole society
can escape the poverty trap simultaneously. If subsidies need to be ﬁnanced cur-
rently, and if this ﬁnancing is not ensured using measures other than taxes, part of
the population will have to pay for them while the rest will enjoy them. Therefore,
inequality will rise after the ﬁrst period in which the measure is introduced. If the
process is continued, the eﬃciency levels of the families so subsidized will exceed ￿0
after a ﬁnite number of periods. This group can now be taxed in some measure, and
the revenue obtained can be used to subsidize the poor families. If the tax sched-
ule is chosen such that the eﬃciency of no succeeding ’rich’ generation falls below
￿0, and if enough revenue is raised to ﬁnance a subsidy for the poor which enables
the latter to reach ￿0 after some time, the program will lead to sustainable growth
for the entire society after a ﬁnite number of periods. The inequality that arises
through such a program – due to fertility diﬀerences between the groups and due to
diﬀerences in the level of eﬃciency – will be discussed in the following section.
5.4 Inequality
Consider a society of homogenous adults. Assume that in the ﬁrst period the entire
economy is in the poverty trap, which is the single stable state of the economy. All
families’ level of eﬃciency is low, and households typically choose the corner solution
w.r.t fertility and τ < 1. Let z > 1, so that unbounded growth is possible, and let
τ > τcrit for all ￿ > ￿0. As already discussed in previous sections, taxes and subsi-
dies which lead to switching between solutions are hard to analyze. For simplicity,
therefore, we will assume that no switching takes place, that is, fertility will be ﬁxed
in the ﬁrst stage of the program. In this case, lump-sum taxes will yield at least the
same revenue as all other taxes discussed so far, and school-attendance subsidies will
increase schooling more cheaply and eﬃciently than any other subsidy. In the ﬁrst
part of the program, therefore, a lump-sum tax should be levied on some part of the
population and the education of the children of another part should be subsidized.5 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 27
Assuming that the subsidy is suﬃcient to raise the receiving families’ level of ef-
ﬁciency to ￿0 or above, it follows that these will subsequently choose τ = 1. The
new situation is therefore one where two groups exist: ’rich’ families, who usually
choose τ = 1 and nr ∈ [nmin,nmax] and ’poor’ families, who usually choose τ < 1
and np = nmax. Given the assumption of assortative mating, the inequality will be
persistent, whereby the ’rich’ families’ level of eﬃciency will rise and ’poor’ families
will slide into the poverty trap. Typically, the population growth rates of the two
groups will be diﬀerent, with nr < np so that the relative number of rich families
will decline over time.
Whether rich families will ever be able to raise suﬃcient revenues to subsidize all
poor families depends on several factors. First, the eﬃciencies of the two groups:
the more eﬃcient they are, the more taxes rich parents can pay, and the smaller
the subsidy needed by poor families to reach ￿0. Second, the relative size of the two
groups: if there are only few ’rich’ and many ’poor’ families, it will be not possible
to raise suﬃcient revenue for all the ’poor’. Third, the minimum number of children
a family can have. As discussed in section 5.2.1, if nmin is large, taxable capacity is
lower than in the case where nmin is very low.
The following simpliﬁed example with nmin suﬃciently close to zero will illustrate
the underlying problems. Assume that all poor families are in the poverty trap, that
there is only one stable steady-state, that sustainable economic growth is possible
for ￿ > ￿0 and that the total subsidy ’poor’ families need in a given period is S. Rich
families – whose initial level of eﬃciency is ￿r > ￿0 – can pay at most 2A￿r(1 − χ)
each, while still choosing τ = 1. In the ﬁrst period, let there be r rich families, so
that total tax revenue will be r2A￿r(1 − χ) ≡ T￿r. If the total tax revenue in the
ﬁrst period is not suﬃcient to pay for the subsidies, the inequality T￿r < S will hold.
In the following period, with population growth rates nr for the rich and np = nmax




rz + T) ≥ S.
Obviously, the relative population growth rates nr/nmax < 1 and the productivity of
the education function z inﬂuence whether ’waiting’ will ever lead to the government
being able to raise suﬃcient revenue to ﬁnance a subsidy for all the poor. After t6 CONCLUSION 28












Depending on z and the fertility rates of the two groups, the tax revenues after P
periods might suﬃce to ﬁnance the subsidies for the ’poor’, that is δ(t = P) ≥ 0. It
is not possible to compute P analytically, but it is possible to ﬁnd an upper limit
for P as follows:











































that δ(t = P) ≥ 0, that is, revenues from taxing ’rich’ families after P periods will
suﬃce to ﬁnance the subsidies for all poor families.
6 Conclusion
In a society where parents decide freely how many children to have and how well to
educate them (as opposed to making them work), and also have some measure of
altruism towards their children, the child-raising costs, the social norms that govern
the provision of support in old age and the productivity of the underlying educa-
tional process all have a vital inﬂuence. One possibility is that the economy will
be trapped in a low-level, stable steady state – or poverty trap – in which adults’
labor eﬃciency and lifetime utility are low, and child labor is the rule. Fertility
will usually be at its exogenously given upper limit, so that, while consumption
and income per family are constant, the total population grows exponentially. Only
if the child-raising costs are suﬃciently low and the educational process is highly
productive can such a state be avoided.6 CONCLUSION 29
Escape from this poverty trap is theoretically always possible if the educational
process is suﬃciently productive (z > 1) and the child-raising costs are not ex-
tremely high. If the government is suﬃciently strongly constrained in raising taxes,
however – for example, by the ease with which taxes can be evaded or by the upper
limits on taxes imposed by minimal consumption needs – it might not be possible
to devise a policy such that the whole society can escape the poverty trap.
Compared to the situation where parents decide only about the extent of schooling,
fertility being given exogenously, the range of child-raising costs such that sustain-
able economic growth is possible is much narrower, and parents have a more limited
choice of how to react to taxes. As they can only reduce current consumption, or
education, or both, taxes will usually lead to a stronger reduction in overall school-
ing than if fertility is endogenous. Therefore, the maximal taxes rich families can
pay without falling back into the poverty trap is lower. On the other hand, the dan-
ger of extinction is not relevant in such a setting. Poor parents could theoretically
be induced to choose full-time schooling through high taxes on the expenditures
on raising children, a step they could aﬀord by reducing their fertility. If fertil-
ity is ﬁxed, however, the measure cannot have this eﬀect. Therefore, in a setting
where schooling alone is analyzed, simultaneous escape of the whole society from
the poverty trap is not possible without outside help.7 APPEDIX 30
7 Appedix
A.1 The corner solution with respect to fertility
If the number of children is ﬁxed (nt = ¯ n), parents will choose the following level of
schooling (the index t has been suppressed):
τ
∗(¯ n,￿) =
z￿(β + β1)[2A￿(1 − χ) + ¯ nAµ + ¯ nb￿] − A¯ nµ
A¯ nµz￿(1 + β + β1)
(14)
In order to investigate the properties of τ∗(·), we begin by disregarding the restric-
tion τ∗ ∈ [0,1]. The shape of the function τ∗(·) depends on two parameters: the
child-raising costs, b, and the parents’ eﬃciency, ￿. Analyzing the function at the
borders of its domain reveals that poorly educated parents cannot aﬀord to send








∗(¯ n,￿) = −∞
lim
￿→∞τ
∗(¯ n,￿) = sign[2A(1 − χ) + b¯ n]∞
Consumption in the ﬁrst period of adult life can be rewritten so the impact of ￿ and
b becomes clear:
C1t = ￿t[2A(1 − χ) + bn] + Aµ(1 − τ)n
If the child-raising costs are suﬃciently small (|b| <
2A(1−χ)
n ), the term in the square
brackets will be positive and ￿t[2A(1 − χ) + bn] will grow without bound for high
levels of eﬃciency. The term describing income from child labor will then be negli-
gible in comparison: as a consequence, parents will be able to aﬀord to send their
oﬀspring to school if the child-raising costs are low. If, on the other hand, |b| is
large, the term in squared brackets will be negative, and child labor will be crucial
to ﬁnancing C1t. For very high levels of eﬃciency, parents will not be able to main-
tain a nonnegative level of consumption in the ﬁrst period: a negative school-time
would be needed, if that were possible.
With 2A(1−χ)￿t being the residual income of a family after payment of the transfer
to the grandparents, the condition 2A(1−χ)+bn ≥ 0, has a natural interpretation.7 APPEDIX 31
If the condition is fulﬁlled, parents do not have to resort to child labor in order to
enjoy positive consumption in the ﬁrst period of adult life. If, on the other hand,
|b| >
2A(1−χ)
¯ n , some child labor will be optimal.
Apart from the behavior of the function τ∗(·) for extreme values of eﬃciency and
child-raising costs, the schooling chosen is characterized by its zeroes and maxima,
which are of major importance for the economic interpretation and relevance of the
closed-form solution in (14). As the numerator is a quadratic function of ￿, one




Az¯ nµ(β + β1) ±
p
Az¯ nµ(β + β1)[Az¯ nµ(β + β1) + 8A(1 − χ) + 4bn]
z(β + β1)[2A(1 − χ) + b¯ n]
(15)
For suﬃciently small costs (|b| <
2A(1−χ)
¯ n ) only one of these will be positive and the
function will have no extrema. For larger costs (|b| >
2A(1−χ)
¯ n ), there will be two ze-
roes and a maximum. As the factor under the square root falls with increasing costs,





the function τ∗(·) will be negative for all levels of eﬃciency if |b| exceeds some limit.
With increasing costs, the ﬁrst zero of the function will move towards larger levels of
eﬃciency: the larger the costs, the less parents can aﬀord to send their children to
school, given that the number of children they have is ﬁxed (τ(b) > τ(b0)∀|b| < |b0|).
The shape of τ∗(¯ n,￿) has been plotted in ﬁgure 1 for diﬀerent costs. For the purposes
of depiction, the intervals for |b| that have been established above will be deﬁned as
’low’, ’moderate’ and ’high’, whereby, in order to depict the shape of the functions
fully, it is necessary to stray way outside the meaningful ranges of the variables. If
the function has no maximum and grows without bound for high levels of eﬃciency, it
will be economically relevant for some levels of eﬃciency ￿ ∈ [max(1,￿a),min(1,￿b)]
so that τ(￿a) = 0 and τ(￿b) = 1. If the function has a maximum, the ranges can be
deﬁned using the zeros of the function, as computed in (15) 19.
19As it can be shown that the maximum of the function lies below 1 for all parameters, the case
where the function is relevant in two separate sections can be ignored.
τmax =
β + β1
1 + β + β1
h
1 −
4A(1 − χ) + 2nb
p
z (β + β1)(2Aχ − 2A − bn)nµA
i
< 17 APPEDIX 32
The impact of changes in ¯ n on τ∗(¯ n,￿) remains to be analyzed. With ∂τ/∂¯ n <
0∀￿, ¯ n, it follows immediately that τ(nmin) > τ(nmax): the fewer children a family
has, the better it will educate them. As parents do not have to spend so much
money just raising children, they can aﬀord to educate them better. On the other
hand, additional education is necessary in order to ﬁnance and maintain consump-
tion in the last period of life. Therefore, if a family has fewer children for any reason,
schooling will increase. A reduced number of children increases C1t if the level of
schooling remains unchanged, while C2t will fall. Therefore, a shift in consumption
between the two periods is needed, and as education is the only variable in which C1t
is decreasing and C2t is increasing, schooling will be increased – if that is possible20.
A.2 The corner solution with respect to education
In this case, too, the solution depends on the parents’ level of eﬃciency and the




(1 + β)[Aµ(1 − ¯ τ) + b￿]
(16)
For very small ￿, the function will be zero or negative for all parameters, while the








2β A(1 + χ)
|b|(1 + β)
> 0
If τ = 1, the function n∗(·) will independent of ￿ (n =
2Aβ(1−χ)
(1+β)|b| > 0), and de-
creasing in |b|. For the value of n to be economically relevant in this case, the









20These considerations are only valid – at this point of the analysis – if the interior solution
w.r.t. education is the household’s optimum. The intuitive argument will be valid for all solutions.7 APPEDIX 33
If τ = 0, n will be negative for low levels of eﬃciency up to the point of discontinu-
ity and positive thereafter. In general, the critical eﬃciency (point of discontinuity)
depends on the chosen schooling and the child-raising costs: ￿ =
Aµ(1−τ)
|b| . For ex-








For n∗(¯ τ,￿) to be economically feasible for any ￿, the child-raising costs have to fulﬁll
the same condition as in the case τ = 1. An exogenous increase in schooling will lead
to a decrease in the number of children a couple decide to have: ∂n/∂τ < 0∀￿,b.
The intuitive argument is the same as in the case where education was interior: An
increase in schooling will lead to a reduction in family income in the ﬁrst period, and
hence in C1t, if all other variables remain unchanged, while C2t will rise. Therefore,
parents will try to shift consumption between periods by reducing fertility.
A.3 The corner solutions w.r.t. both variables
A.3.1 4u(n)
4u(n) := u(nmax, ¯ τ) − u(nmin, ¯ τ) > 0
⇔
ln
h2A(1 − χ)￿ + A(1 − ¯ τ)µnmax + b￿nmax




hA(z￿¯ τ + 1)χnmax
A(z￿¯ τ + 1)χnmin
i
+ β1ln
h(z￿¯ τ + 1)




2A(1 − χ)￿ + A(1 − ¯ τ)µnmax + b￿nmax
































the left-hand side of (17) will be nonnegative. Since nmin < nmax and 1+β > 1, the
term on the right-hand side of the inequality will be negative or zero. Therefore,
the critical eﬃciency for 4u(n) > 0 will be negative or zero, so that u(nmax, ¯ τ) >
u(nmin, ¯ τ) for all levels of eﬃciency. If the child-raising costs are low, choosing the













both sides of condition (17) will be negative, and u(nmax, ¯ τ) > u(nmin, ¯ τ) only if
￿ <














Choosing the maximal number of children, then, will only be optimal for poor par-
ents, while well-educated households will prefer having few children if the costs of
raising them are large. The lower the child-raising costs and the lower the level of
schooling, the higher is the critical level of eﬃciency.
A.3.2 4u(τ)
4u(τ) > 0 ⇔ (18)
ln
h2A(1 − χ)￿ + A¯ nµ + ¯ nb￿











2A(1 − χ)￿ + A¯ nµ + ¯ nb￿












Therefore 4u(τ) has at least one zero or point of discontinuity. For |b| >
2A(1−χ)
¯ n , the
function will have a single point of discontinuity for positive levels of eﬃciency, and
none otherwise. As all ’goods’ are necessary in consumption, and as the condition
|b| ≥
2A(1−χ)
¯ n yields C1t(τ = 1) ≤ 0, it follows that τt = 0 whenever |b| ≥
2A(1−χ)
¯ n .
That is to say, the children must then be put to work full-time in order to ﬁnance7 APPEDIX 35
their parents’ consumption in the ﬁrst period of adult life.
If, on the other hand, |b| <
2A(1−χ)
¯ n , parents can aﬀord to educate their children,
both τ = 0 and τ = 1 are possible optima, and the function 4u(τ) has no point of
discontinuity. The derivative ∂4u(τ)/∂￿ being always negative for small costs and
as 4u(τ) takes all values between −∞ and ∞, it follows that the function 4u(τ)
will have a single zero in the interval 0 ≤ ￿ < ∞.
By analyzing the two cases β + β1 > 1 and β + β1 < 1 separately, it is possible
to approximate the critical levels of eﬃciency for 4u(τ) > 0 and 4u(τ) < 0. If
β + β1 < 1 a simpliﬁcation 21 of the system yields:
4u(τ) > 0 ⇐
2A(1 − χ)￿ + A¯ nµ + ¯ nb￿
2A(1 − χ)￿ + ¯ nb￿
> z￿ + 1
This inequality can easily be solved for the critical level of eﬃciency:









z[2A(1 − χ) + ¯ nb]
￿
The result in the case β + β1 > 1 will be identical. In both cases, the condition for
the critical level of eﬃciency derived above is necessary but not suﬃcient.
It should be noted that for extremely large child-raising costs, even full-time child
labor cannot ensure nonnegative C1t, with the critical value for the costs depending








A.4 Potential Steady States: the interior solution w.r.t. τ




Anµ[(β + β1)(z − 1) − 1]






Anµ[(β + β1)(z − 1) − 1]2
￿
− 4z(β + β1)2(2A(1 − χ) + nb)
i
2z(β + β1)(2A(1 − χ) + nb)
21The simpliﬁcation used is:
2A(1−χ)￿+A¯ nµ+¯ nb￿
2A(1−χ)￿+¯ nb￿ > (z￿ + 1)1 > (z￿ + 1)(β+β1)7 APPEDIX 36






Aµ[(β + β1)(z − 1) − 1]2
4z(β + β1)2 (21)
If (21) is not satisﬁed, there will be no ￿ so that τ = τcrit for the interior solution
w.r.t education22. If, on the contrary, (21) is satisﬁed, the two functions will have
up to two points of intersection, depending on the exact size of b, z and (β + β1).
If, further, the total weight of the future arguments of utility is suﬃciently smaller
than that of C1t, that is, (β+β1) < 1, and if the productivity of education (z) is not




z(β+β1)2 ≤ |b| ≤
2A(1−χ)
n , there will be two points of intersection
23. If, however, |b| >
2A(1−χ)
n , the root in (20) being larger than the term before it,
only one of the signs will yield ￿ > 0, so that the two functions will cross only once.
22Both values in (20) will be complex numbers.
23The term under the square root in (20) will be positive but smaller than the term before it,
so that both signs will yield a positive eﬃciency.References
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Figure 6i: The Household’s Decision and Phase Diagram: z > 1 and |b| >
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